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of record,

GREENER

BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT p .A, hereby file this Reply Brief pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c), to rebut certain of the arguments set forth in the Respondent's
Brief, filed on irngust 8, 2016. The i'unolds expressly reserve rebuttal to, and do not concede to,
any arguments· set forth in Respondent's Brief, but instead provide this Reply Brief for the
purpose of addressing some of the primary factual and legal issues in this Appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Petitioners Are Entitled to Judicial Review

As it did before the District Court, Respondent City of Stanley ("City") has attempted to
escape scrutiny in this action by claiming that the Arnolds are not entitled to any judicial review
over the denial of their Building Permit Application No. 831, despite the fact that the City's own
Municipal Code specifically affords that right to any applicant denied a building permit. Stanley
Municipal Code ("SMC") 15.04.040. In effect, the City attempts to evade review of its decisions
regarding the property rights of persons within its jurisdiction - rendering the Mayor and City
Council immune from constitutional requirements and limitations - by asserting that the 2010
amendments to the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), Idaho Code § 67-6501, et seq.,
eliminated the reviewability of building permit denials. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 5-8.) However,
the City ignores a fundamental piece of its own history. The City's Municipal Code was
amended by Ordinance No. 184 on February 10, 2011- after the 2010 amendments to LLUPAto

incorporate

what

the

City

referred

http://www.stanley.id.gov/City%20Documents/
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to

as

"Omnibus

Revisions."

Omnibus%200rdinance.pdf.)

(See

Among those

SMC 15.04.040:
REVIEW: An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a
decision of the city council may seek judicial review under the
procedures provided by Idaho Code sections 67-5215(b)
through (g) and 67-5216, and any amendments thereto.111

(Id. at p. 11.) That appears to be the version of SMC 15.04.040 that was in effect at the time that
the Arnolds' Building Permit No. 831 was denied, on March 31, 2014. (Amended Agency
Record ("AR") at 57-64.) SMC 15.04.040 was not later amended until Ordinance No. 192,
passed on April 7, 2014 (which version also included a right of judicial review, but removed any
reference to specific statutory provisions). (See http://www.stanley.id.gov/City%20Docurnents/
0rdinance%20192%20Building%20Permits.pdf.) Thus, the Stanley Municipal Code that was in
effect at the time of the City's denial of the Arnolds' building permit application, and
consequently the governing ordinance for purposes of this Appeal (Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Idaho

Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968)), expressly incorporated a right of judicial review for
persons adversely affected by a denial of a building permit within its jurisdiction.
However, even if the Court accepts the City's invitation to disregard the right of judicial
review that the City had expressly extended to its residents, there is no authority presented by the
City to support the contention that the 2010 amendment to LLUP A eliminated judicial review of

1

Although Idaho Code §§ 67-5215 and 67-5216 were repealed in 1992, the SMC's
reference to those sections indicates an intention by the Stanley City Council to incorporate into
its building permit process (formerly SMC Title 17.56.010-050, likely in effect before 1992) the
judicial review rights and procedures formerly described therein for review of the decisions of
state agencies. 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273, §§ 15-16, pp. 709-711.
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Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008). The City admits as
much, acknowledging that in the post-2010 world, "there is no case regarding judicial review of
a building perrriit" (Respondent's Brief, p. 6, n. 11.) Instead, the City asks Llie Court to infer, in
the absence of any legislative history indicating this to be the Legislature's intention, that the
alteration of the wording in LLUP A that occurred in 2010 was necessarily intended to restrict or
limit the availability of judicial review, and to specifically exclude its availability in the building
permit process.2 (Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7.)
Respectfully, the Arnolds disagree. By its decision to replace the word "permit" with
"application," it appears that the Legislature intended to broaden, not restrict, the availability of
judicial review under LLUP A. No longer. is the statute limited to those specific and limited
matters for which a "permit" can be issued; rather, the net is now cast wide to include the
broader universe of matters for which an "application" must be made under LLUP A.
LC.§ 67-6521. Thus, the salient question on the jurisdictional issue presented by the City in this
Appeal is whether a building permit application is one that is "required or authorized" by
LLUP A, for purposes of the judicial review provisions set forth in Idaho Code § 67-6521. The

2

The City's "practical" argument in this regard is belied by these very proceedings. The
City claims that there are certain characteristics of the review process for an application brought
under authority of LLUPA that are not present in the review process for a building permit
application: transcribable record, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and public meetings.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 7.) In this case, the City literally did all of these things (with the
exception of its failed attempt at keeping a complete transcribable record), demonstrating that
until it saw fit to argue otherwise in this litigation, even it considered the building permit review
process to be as required by LLUP A.
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a

answer to
and statutory implications of the City's position.

The City's claim that decisions on applications for building permits are not performed
pursuant to LLUPA (and, thus, not subject to the judicial review rights guaranteed u...rider
LLUPA) raises an important constitutional question: If not by LLUPA, on what statutory
authority does the City of Stanley have any power to regulate improvement of private property
within its jurisdiction? If that authority is not found in, and thus not subject to, LLUP A, then it
must be found elsewhere, lest the City's entire Municipal Code pertaining to building permits be
rendered an unconstitutional and unauthorized regulatory taking of private property rights,
devoid of statutory authorization from the State and due process of law. The City, for its part, has
not provided any other legal basis authorizing such action by municipalities.
The answer to this question fortunately does not require complex legal analysis, and leads
directly back to the necessary conclusion that judicial review is available here. There is, in fact,
no other provision in the Idaho Code that would authorize the City to regulate building and
construction on private property beyond that which is covered in LLUP A. Specific to this case,
for instance, all of the matters addressed by Title 15 of the Stanley Municipal Code (Buildings
and Construction) are matters that are included within the zoning powers of a governing body
under LLUPA:
Within a zoning district, the governing board shall where
appropriate establish standards to regulate and restrict the
height, number of stories, size, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair or use of buildings and structures; percentage
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§ 67-6511(a) (emphasis added). Thus, it is through the powers conferred by LLUPA that the
City is even able to impose standards for building and construction: "Standards may be

provided as part of zoning, subdivision, planned unit development, or separate ordinance
adopted, amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and hearing procedures provided in
section 67-6509, Idaho Code." LC. § 67-6518 (emphasis added). Here, the City has chosen to
impose those standards by operation of Title 15 of the Stanley Municipal Code. 3 By extension,
an application for a building permit is one that falls squarely within the definition of those
applications that are "required or authorized" by LLUPA, as it is an application to take action
according to the standards set in force by the City pursuant to its authority under LLUP A:
As part of ordinances required or authorized under this chapter, a
procedure shall be established for processing in a timely manner
applications for zoning changes, subdivisions, variances, special
use permits and such other applications required or authorized
pursuant to this chapter for which a reasonable fee may be charged.
LC. § 67-6519(1). It was through LLUPA, and LLUPA alone, that the City had the power to
require the Arnolds to submit a building permit application to begin with, and it is through
LLUPA that the Arnolds' are consequently entitled to a right of judicial review.
It must be noted that the implications of allowing judicial review over denial of building
permits are not as catastrophic as the City would have this Court believe. (See Respondent's

As set forth above, even the City's Building and Construction Code provisions - now
codified in Title 15 of the Stanley Municipal Code - were originally codified in Title 17
("Zoning Regulations") until February, 2011.
3
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are

exact same

were

amendments to LLUPA. See, e.g., Giltner Dairy, 145 Idaho 630. Although the City warns that
permitting judicial review over building permit decisions would result in the requirement that
"every building permit issued in this State can oriJy be issued following a public hearing"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 8), that conclusion is not warranted by the plain language of the review
process set forth in LLUP A. The Arnolds addressed this argument below:
The City's argument is empty hyperbole, and is not supported by
the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-652l(b). By that statutory
language, a public hearing would not be required in order to
initially evaluate and make a decision on every permit, as claimed
by the City. Rather, a hearing would only be required if one was
requested by the affected party upon an initial adverse decision.
This is basic due process; this is the law. Clearly, most building
permits are resolved without a hearing because it is only where the
approval of a building permit is in dispute that the right of a public
hearing and transcribable record becomes relevant. Such is the case
here. Had the permit been approved, then no public hearing,
transcribable record, or written findings would have become
necessary. Similarly, if the denial of the Arnolds' building permit
occurred without a hearing, it would only be upon the Arnolds'
petition that a public hearing would be required.
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 106-107.) The District Court correctly found that judicial review was available
under these circumstances. On Appeal, the City has merely repeated its argument without any
additional analysis or argument to suggest that the Arnolds' explanation was incorrect and/or that
the District Court's decision was in error.
Finally, the Arnolds note that the substantive decision of the City, as upheld by the
District Court, imposed affirmative findings of fact and conclusions of law that exceeded the
mere denial of a building permit, and this Appeal is therefore not limited to the sole issue of the
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more

lS

unjustifiably and unlawfully determined that the Arnolds do not have access from Lot 5 to the
abutting public roadway, Ace of Diamonds Street. Although this case originated with a properly
submitted application for a building permit, it has in effect become an inverse condemnation
action brought about by the City's findings of fact and conclusions of law that Petitioners are no
longer entitled to their vested and appurtenant property right of access to the abutting public
roads. (AR at 57-64.) This is an entirely separate issue on appeal (see Petitioners' Opening Brief,
p. 24 (Issue No. 2)), which has nothing to do with LLUP A and is certainly reviewable by this
Court, as it calls into question whether a governing body may use a simple administrative action
(such as acting on a building permit application) to reach conclusions of law that have far greater
adverse consequences to the property owner (such as the denial of a constitutionally-protected
access right to one's property).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the City has failed to demonstrate how this Court would
not have jurisdiction over the matters presented in this Appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

The City and the District Court Erred In Concluding that the Arnolds Do
Not Have a Right of Access to Ace of Diamonds Street.
A.

Access to Public Roadways is a Vested and Appurtenant Property
Right Absent Proper Exercise of Police Power.

On page four of the City's Brief, it explains its position regarding the ability of the
Arnolds to establish access to the abutting public streets, as opposed to only taking access from
the right-of-way set forth in the Mountain View Subdivision Plat: "This does not mean that two
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accesses are

a

when such material changes are presented." (Respondent's Brief, p. 4.)

so arguing, the City

presents the law exactly backwards. Indeed, there is no precedent in the State of Idaho - nor

property abuts a public right-of-way does not have legal access to that right-of-way absent a

valid and prior exercise of police power by a governmental entity. Certainly, the City has not
provided this Court with any citation to authority that even remotely stands for its stated
proposition.
However, in addition to the case law and other analytic authority set forth in the Arnolds'
Opening Brief, case law from around the United States further illustrates the propriety of a
property owner's ability to access abutting roadways absent any prior regulation to the contrary,
as well as the proper way for a governmental entity to restrict such access if it wishes to do so.
In Ryder v. Petrea, 243 Va. 421, 416 S.E.2d 686 (Va. 1992), for example, the Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed a similar question regarding the availability of multiple access points for a lot
in a platted subdivision. In Ryder, a parcel of property was subdivided by the original owner who
subsequently sold lots to various purchasers. Id. at 687. As a part of the Subdivision Plat, the
original owner laid out a right-of-way extending north from Route 620 to provide access to the
subdivision lots (Id. at 687), not dissimilar to how the Mountain View Subdivision plat included
a "Private Access And Utility Easement" extending south from State Highway 21 (AR at 65).
After the various lots in the subdivision had changed hands from the original purchasers,
one of the subsequent owners of Lot 1 (which abutted both the platted right-of-way and Route
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at
ov\<ner of most of the other property that abutted the platted right-of-way (both to the north of Lot
1 on the east side of the platted right-of-way, as well as the property on the west side of the
platted right-of-way), blocked access to Lot 1 from the platted right-of-,:vay "by erecting a fence
between lot one and the right-of-way." Id. In the ensuing litigation, the trial court determined that
Lot 1 "had no easement over the right-of-way because [it] fronted on Route 620" and therefore
already had a means of ingress and egress. Id.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court, and with the
contention that "no such rights [to access the private easement] can be acquired when the
subdivision lots also abut upon a public street, as in this case." Ryder at 688. The Virginia
Supreme Court relied on its prior precedent in Lindsay v. James, 188 Va. 646, 51 S.E2d 326
(Va. 1949), in which it had addressed the scope of easement rights as distinguished :from rights to
access abutting streets:
[the view] adopted in this jurisdiction, limits the extent of
easements of this nature to such streets and alleys shown on the
plat as are reasonably beneficial to the grantee, and a deprivation
of which would reduce the value of his lot. In any event, such
grantee is entitled to an easement in streets and alleys adjoining
his lot.
Ryder at 688 (citing Lindsay at 329) (emphasis in original). This is entirely consistent with the

law of the state ofidaho, as previously set forth in Petitioners' Opening Brief. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 P.2d 291 (1964) ("This court has consistently held that access to

a public way is one of the incidents of ownership of land bounding thereon"); State v. HI
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1
"is one of the incidents ofland ownership.").
The facts of Ryder and the instant litigation are undoubtedly distinguishable. In Ryder, a
private property owner sought to invalidate a right of access via a private easement by virtue of
the fact that the property had alternate access to a public road. Here, in contrast, the Respondent
governmental entity has sought to invalidate a right of access via a public road by virtue of the
fact that the property has alternate access to a private easement. Notwithstanding the factual
differences, the Virginia Supreme Court's analysis is equally applicable to the facts at bar:
We note that Townes' plat shows the easement as a right-of-way
and not a street or alley. In our opinion, that makes no difference.
A "street" is a "way," Black's Law Dictionary 1421 (6th ed. 1990),
and a "way," in a technical sense, is a right of passage over land.
Id. at 1593. A "right of way" is a term used to describe a right
belonging to a party to pass over land of another. Id. at 1326.
Accordingly, purchasers of subdivision lots may acquire the same
private easements of passage over "rights-of-way" that are
shown on a subdivision plat as they would acquire over streets
and alleys that are shown on such a plat. l4J
Ryder at 688 (emphasis added). Whether the facts involve a litigant attempting to deprive

another of access rights via a public road or a private easement, the salient and controlling legal
conclusion in either scenario is the same: Wherever property abuts the public roadways, absent
statute or lawful regulation to the contrary (exercised properly under the police powers of the
state and its political subdivisions), a property owner has a legal, vested, and appurtenant right to

4

Notably, the abutting termination of Ace of Diamonds street is shown on the Mountain
View Subdivision plat, without any notation indicating that access rights via that public road
were in any way affected by the plat or the subdivision approval. (AR at 65.)
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access
legal authority nor consistent with any legal precedent in this state or elsewhere.
B.

The City of Stanley Has Not Regulated Access to Ace of Diamonds
Street from Lot 5.

The City's Brief focuses upon a straw man argument; what the City has claimed to be the
Arnolds' argument is not supported by anything that the Arnolds have ever argued. Rather than
addressing the argument set forth by the Arnolds in their Opening Brief - that although the City
has the ability to execute its police powers to regulate access to its streets, the record
demonstrates that it has not exercised those powers as between Ace of Diamonds street and Lot 5
(Petitioners' Opening Brief, p. 30) - the City has attempted to distract the inquiry from the real
legal issues in this action, instead casting the Arnolds' argument as something entirely different:
"Arnold believes that Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209
(1968) ("Lomoncf') supports the conclusion that unless a municipality has adopted an
encroachment permit ordinance any lot owner in a duly approved subdivision enjoys an
unfettered right to access city real property including its right of way; that a city is powerless to
regulate access to its own property." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 26-27 (emphasis added).)

Setting aside the fact that the City has now made an illogical leap between access to city streets
and the totality of "city real property," which is not justifiable upon even the broadest
interpretation of the Arnolds' argument, the City's assertion is plainly wrong.
As opposed to allegedly claiming that "a city is powerless to regulate access to its own
property," the Arnolds argued in their Opening Brief the exact opposite: "This is not to say, as
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is

to

property from the public roadways .... " (Petitioners' Opening Brief, p. 30 (emphasis added).)

It is not understandable to the Arnolds why the City would so noticeably misstate their argument,

of their access rights to Ace of Diamonds Street, the City is attempting to substantively alter the
legal question at issue into one that makes the Arnolds appear quite unreasonable to this Court.
Plainly stated, it is irrational to suggest that the Arnolds - one of whom is a sitting Commissioner
for the Ada County Highway District, an entity responsible for, inter alia, regulating access to
public roadways - have argued that the City of Stanley is "powerless to regulate access" to its
public roadways.
More importantly, however, the City has distorted the rule of law set forth in Lomond,
glossing over the legal principles that mandate a reversal of the City's and the District Court's
decisions. The City states: "Lomond merely reiterates ... that an ordinance generally should not
restrict an abutting property owner [sic] right of access unless the ordinance is justified by the
city's police power." (Respondent's Brief, p. 27.) This is not at all an accurate representation of

Lomond, as evidenced by a plain reading of that decision. In Lomond, this Court did not only
indicate that an ordinance affecting private property rights must be "justified by the city's police
power," but also that the exercise of that police power must have already been exercised and in
full force and effect prior to it being used as a justification for the denial of a building permit:
On the basis of appellant's evidence and the testimony of Officer
Nielson, it is apparent that the City's refusal to grant an access
from appellant's land to 17th Street is not justified by
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The fact that appellant's
requested an
access across the planting easement was not a sufficient reason to
refuse to issue the permit, and appellant, having complied with all
existing requirements at the time of filing its application, was
at that time entitled to the building permit it requested.
Lomond, 92 Idaho at 603 (emphasis added). This conclusion was preceded by a considerably

lengthy analysis of competing case law from around the country, from which the Idaho Supreme
Court concluded that "[t]he weight of (and in our opinion the better reasoned) authority from
other jurisdictions ... is to the effect that a public official must issue a building permit when the
applicant has complied with all existing requirements." Id. at 600 (emphasis added).

In view of the foregoing, the City's argument regarding what justifications might exist for
the City's restriction of access from Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds Street is entirely irrelevant. The
sole factor of import is that the City had not, at any time prior to the Arnolds' Building Permit
Application No. 831 (nor any of its predecessor permits) enacted any law, statute, ordinance,
code, regulation, condition, or any other exercise of police power, restricted access to Ace of
Diamonds Street from the private property that abuts it - including the Arnolds' Lot 5. Absent
such an exercise of that power - regardless of whether the City can presently make an argument
as to why such restrictions could be justified - the City and the District Court both erred in citing
such an alleged access restriction as the primary basis for denying the building permit.
Effectively, as noted, the City has used the building permit process to commit an act of inverse
condemnation, a regulatory taking, and the District Court has erroneously condoned that
conduct.
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an

the

restriction of access to Ace of Diamonds Street from Lot 5, the City asks the Court to read into
the Mountain View Subdivision plat an access restriction that is nowhere to be found

expressly

or impliedly. Curiously, while asking the Court to find a restriction in t.lie !vfountain Vie,v
Subdivision plat that is not there, the City wholly ignores the restrictions that are there. On pages
25 through 27 of Respondent's Brief, the City argues that a restriction of access between Ace of
Diamonds Street and Lot 5 would be justified to avoid "potential connectivity through Lots 5 and
6 to Highway 21" and because "this private driveway will be utilized by the public; i.e. the
customers of the potential myriad of permitted uses to this commercial lot." (Respondent's Brief,
p. 26.) The City is chasing windmills in its efforts to exaggerate the "potential" problems with
the construction that is the subject of the Arnolds' building permit are belied by the very
subdivision plat that the City has made central to its argument. First, because the westerly access
road adjoining Lot 5 and Highway 21 is specifically denoted to be a "Private Access And Utility
Easement," there is literally no threat that a driveway on the opposite side of the property, which

does not even connect to that private access road, will become the City's new public
thoroughfare between downtown Stanley and Highway 21. Further, regarding the City's fear of
"the myriad of permitted uses to this commercial lot," the City is again reminded that the
Mountain View Subdivision plat specifically includes a notation, as voluntarily agreed upon
between the Arnolds and the City at the time the subdivision was created, that Lot 5 is restricted
from being used for any of those myriad commercial purposes. (AR at 65.) Note 2 on the righthand side of the plat reads: "Lots 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Mountain View Subdivision, as shown hereon,
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zone.

Stanley Municipal Code limits Residential A development to churches, single family dwellings,
parks and playgrounds, and schools (SMC 17 .16), the supposed dangers of the "potential myriad
of permitted uses to tbis corrunercial lot" simply do not exist.
Although the City's disregard of the actual restrictions in the Mountain View Subdivision
plat is perplexing, it does highlight that there is a process that can be followed to impose
restrictions in conjunction with the approval of a subdivision plat. The Supreme Court of
California's decision in Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1949) illustrates that process well. Ayres was a mandamus proceeding "brought to compel
the respondent city council to approve a proposed subdivision map without certain conditions."

Ayres at 2. The design of the proposed subdivision included residential lots, and "[t]he so-called
cellular design of residence lot subdivision was employed so that the rear of residential lots abuts
the principal thoroughfares, thus prohibiting access to the lots therefrom." Id. Among the
conditions sought to be imposed upon the approval of the subdivision, the Los Angeles City
Council included a provision that "an additional 10-foot strip along the rear of the lots be
restricted to the planting of trees and shrubbery for the purpose of preventing direct ingress and
egress between the lots and Sepulveda Boulevard" (Id. at 3), on the basis that "the creation of the
subdivision necessitated the restricted use to confine ingress and egress to and from the lots away
from Sepulveda Boulevard" (Id. at 5). Rejecting the petitioner's argument that the subdivision
ought to be approved without the stated conditions, the California Supreme Court found: "The
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been out of harmony with the neighborhood plan and traffic needs." Id. at 6.
The City did not follow the standard procedures for imposing access restrictions in the

City to now claim that there was a restriction in the creation of the Mountain View Subdivision
that eliminated the otherwise vested and appurtenant property right for Lot 5 to access the
abutting public roadway. Quite clearly, the Mountain View Subdivision plat depicts, inter alia,
the east side of Lot 5 abutting what is clearly marked as the western termination of Ace of
Diamonds Street. (AR at 65.) However, there is no condition or other restriction written into the
plat, nor in any subdivision approval that the City has been able to point to, that expressly limits
the access to the subdivision's lots to merely the "Private Access And Utility Easement."
In sum, while the City certainly has the ability to regulate access to its public roads
within the confines of the police powers conferred upon it by the State, there is nothing in the
history of Lot 5 or the general regulation of the City's streets, including the approval of the
Mountain View Subdivision plat and its lack of any conditions of approval, that has ever
restricted the vested and appurtenant access rights incidental to the ownership of Lot 5 where it
abuts Ace of Diamonds Street. Even if this Court upholds the denial of Building Permit No. 831
on some other basis, the Arnolds respectfully request that the Court correct the errors of the City
and District Court, such that the unlawful access limitation that has now been unjustifiably
authorized by the District Court be reversed and the Arnolds are reinstated their vested property
rights incidental to their ownership of Lot 5.
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As set forth in the Arn.olds' Opening Brief, with specific attention to this Court's decision
in Lomond, "a public official must issue a building permit when the applicant has complied with
all existing requirements." 92 Idaho at 600. In defending against this Appeal, and the weight of
authority set forth in Lomond, the City has attempted to justify its denial of the Arnolds' building
permit application by imposing burdens upon the Arnolds that the Stanley Municipal Code does
not place upon an applicant at the application stage of the building and construction process.
(See Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-17.) The City has incorrectly applied its own Municipal Code in

two ways. First, the City has confused the code's requirements as they pertain to an applicant
versus how they apply to a permittee. Second, the City has confused the requirements for the
issuance of a building permit and the requirements for the approval of a subdivision. These will
be addressed in tum.
A.

The City Code Does Not Require a Building Permit Application to
Include Detailed Engineering Information.

The first error in the City's responsive analysis of the straightforward building permit
process, which is clearly detailed in its ovvn code and had been followed without incident by the
Arnolds many times before, is that the City has taken the various steps of the building process
(including applying for and obtaining a permit, as well as action that may only logically occur
after the issuance of a permit) and front-loaded them all into the application phase of that

process. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9.) Through its use of ellipses in quoting its code quotations,
the City has confused its own process. The City writes, "SMC 15.04 governs the process for the
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authority for the "process for the issuance of a building permit." In fact, SMC 15.04.010 does not
govern that process at all. Rather, SMC 15.04.010 simply explains that a building permit must
first be obtained prior to the construction, erection, or alteration of any strncture. It is, in a word,

an overview of the construction process, from start to finish, according to the Code, including an
explanation of the sort of work for which no building permit is required at all. SMC 15.04.010.
That section does not, as argued by the City, detail or otherwise describe any aspect of the
"process for the issuance of a building permit." As to the language within section 15.04.010 upon
which the City has focused, that a "Permittee shall follow good engineering practices"
(emphasis added), it is illogical to suggest that this phrase imposes an added requirement upon an
applicant to provide highly-detailed engineering documentation (of the sort never before

required by the City in its handling of any of the Arnolds' prior building permit applications). 5
An applicant, by its nature, is one who has not yet received a permit; conversely, a permittee, by
its nature, is one who has already received a permit. While section 15.04.010 of the Stanley

5 The

City, as it did below and as the District Court did below, has focused on the phrase,
"great quantities of fill material," in reference to what the Arnolds allegedly sought to place "on
the City's right of way." (Respondent's Brief, p. 2.) The record is completely devoid of any
evidence of this "fact." It is an exaggeration that the City placed into its original findings of fact
and conclusions of law, without any factual support in the record before it or now before this
Court. Rather, the Arnolds' building permit application (AR at 69-70) clearly shows that the
Arnolds were merely going to overlay a small amount of gravel between the driveway and the
dead-end culmination of the dirt road known as Ace of Diamonds, in order to ensure a safe
connection between the public road and the proposed driveway. This is identical to that which
the City had previously approved. (AR at 44-45.) Certainly, the Arnolds did not request to place
"great quantities of fill material" on the City's right-of-way; the City's argument in this respect is
yet another straw man argument.
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sentence cannot be reasonably interpreted to impose the added requirement here
thrust upon the Arnolds to prove the sound engineering practices of something that is not yet
engineered.

The code provisions actually setting forth the "process for the issuance of a building
permit" are set forth in SMC 15.04.020, which reads (in the version in effect at the time of the
denial of the Arnolds' Building Permit Application No. 831):
Applications for building permits shall be submitted in the form
specified by resolution of the city council and shall be
accompanied by the application fee, a drawing showing the
location of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the
location of the property in the city, building plans and
specifications, and proof of approval of the proposed project by the
appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer district of
state health department. Applications which do not contain all of
the foregoing shall not be considered complete.
SMC

15.04.020

(2011)

(available

at

Ordinance%20192%20Building%20Permits.pdf).

http://www.stanley.id.gov/City%20Documents/
Just as they had done before, the Arnolds

submitted a complete application (on the City's form) that fully complied with these
requirements. (AR at 69-70.) According to Lomond, approval of the building permit was at that
moment a "ministerial duty of the city building official." 92 Idaho at 600.
The remaining language of SMC 15.04.020 then in effect adds no further assistance to the
City: "Development and construction drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or
otherwise in sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the
proposed development complies with all zoning requirements." As argued previously, there were
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public streets, as more fully addressed in the next section of this brief.
Because a plain reading of the Stanley Municipal Code cannot lead to the conclusion that
a building permit applicant, at the application stage, had a.TJ.y duty to provide detailed engineerLTJ.g
information to the City upon submission of the basic application, the City had a duty to approve
the Arnolds' duly submitted Building Permit Application No. 831. If the party seeking the
building permit meets all the standards prescribed in the ordinance, a city council has no
discretion to deny the permit. The council's refusal to grant the permit in such circumstances is
arbitrary as a matter of law. See, e.g., Southern Co-op. Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d
1347, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1983) ("There was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding
plaintiffs' compliance with the requirements of the Subdivision Regulations. Under these
circumstances the defendants had an administrative duty to approve the plaintiffs' proposed plat
and their refusal to do so was a violation of the plaintiffs' guarantee of due process." (Emphasis
added.)); Chase v. City of Minneapolis,. 401 N.W.2d 408, 412-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 424-26, 178 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.C. 1970); Vagnoni v.
Brady, 218 A.2d 235, 237 (Pa. 1966) ("The issuance of a building permit, once the prerequisite

conditions have been fulfilled, is merely a ministerial act."); Boxell v. Planning Commission of
City of Maumee, 225 N.E.2d 610, 615-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) ("Upon such full compliance

with the ordinances and statutes, as a matter of law the Common Pleas Court should have found
the proposed subdivision to be reasonable and proper and that the refusal of the planning
commission to approve the proposed subdivision without plat was unreasonable and unlawful.").
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In addition to arguing that SMC 15.04.010 imposed additional submission requirements
upon the Arnolds, the City also asserts that the Arnolds' had a heightened application burden by
virtue of two other "zoning requirements" allegedly applicable to their proposed construction:
SMC 16.36 and 17.40.032. (Respondent's Brief, p. 9.) Notably, each of these code sections apply
only to "Hillside" development, as set forth in the Stanley Municipal Code. Because the Arnolds'
Lot 5 is not classified as such, according to the City's own actions, such "zoning requirements"
do not apply to the proposed driveway from Ace of Diamonds into Lot 5.
First, SMC 16.36 is a subdivision classification that is used when "any subdivision, or
portion thereof, [has] an average slope of ten percent (10%) or more." SMC 16.08.180. When
that is the case

something that is evaluated and established at the time of the subdivision's

formation - the subdivision is classified as a "Special Development" under SMC 16.32, and the
provisions of Chapter 16.36 of the Stanley Municipal Code apply. As set forth in SMC
16.32.010, "The purpose of chapters 16.36 through 16.44 of this title is to identify various types
of developments that normally pose special concerns to the commission and elected officials

when reviewing and acting upon subdivision requests." SMC 16.32.010 (emphasis added). In
other words, the Hillside evaluation, including the engineering (soils, geology, hydrology) and
grading plans, are all reviewed at the time of the subdivision creation. In the case at bar, the
Mountain View Subdivision was not found to be a Hillside development under SMC 16.36 when
it was created- a determination made by the City, not the Arnolds. As such, the requirements for
a Hillside subdivision are not applicable to Lot 5 of the Mountain View Subdivision.
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Development, which renders moot all of the provisions of 16.36, the City has never presented
any real evidence that any characteristic of Lot 5 would warrant a re-classification of Mountain
View, even if that were possible. In the agency proceedings, the City merely speculated that
"[t]he subdivision is characterized by slopes that may exceed 15 per cent," but blamed the
Arnolds for not providing detailed information in that regard. (AR at 60 (emphasis added).) If the
subdivision was truly "characterized by slopes" exceeding fifteen percent, it should have been
classified by the City as a Hillside subdivision to begin with. As it was not, the Arnolds were
entitled to rely upon the City's prior decision not to classify it as such, as is this Court, especially
in the absence of any evidence by the City that some other standard is warranted by
demonstrable facts. On appeal, the only "proof' that the City adds to justify a reversal of its prior
non-classification of Mountain View as a Hillside subdivision is a request that the Court conduct
an expert analysis of the "contour lines of this slope," as depicted on a drawing found, but not
verified by Affidavit, in the Agency record. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11, n. 25.) This "evidence" is
specious, at best. Given the fact that Mountain View has never been classified as a Hillside
subdivision, none of the "zoning requirements" contained within SMC 16.36 were applicable to
the Arnolds' Building Permit Application No. 831.
Finally, the City's reliance upon the "zoning requirements" set forth in SMC 17.40.032 is
equally problematic. Pursuant to Section A of SMC 17.40.032, "[t]he provisions of this section
shall apply to any building site where the topographic slope of said building site exceeds fifteen
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situs of the proposed driveway in this case exceeds fifteen, or even ten, percent.

C.

The District Court Erred by Finding that the City Did Not Act
Arbitrarily and Capriciously In Violation of the Arnolds' Property
Rights.

In talcing action on an application that substantially affects a property owner's use and
enjoyment of his property, a municipality is held to a much greater standard than mere
speculation.

"A city's actions are considered an abuse of discretion when the actions are

arbitrary, capricious or umeasonable." Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
91,175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007); see also, Rehmann v. City of Des Moines, 204 N.W. 267, 269-70
(Iowa 1925) ("The authority, delegated to municipalities to impose building restrictions and
regulations, does not carry with it the authority to arbitrarily prevent the owner from improving
his property. Independent of the power to regulate and enact restrictions, the owner of the
property has the absolute right to improve it and use it in any lawful way or for any lawful
purpose."). Lacking any evidence that Lot 5 and/or the Mountain View Subdivision had
characteristics that subjected them to any additional zoning requirements (and in fact having
acknowledged previously that Mountain View was not a Hillside subdivision), the City acted
without adequate determining principles and without a rational basis.
Courts have regularly reversed the denial of a building permit where the denial is based
on insufficient "determining principles." See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co.,
486 U.S. 750, 770-72 (1988) ("We hold those portions of the Lakewood ordinance giving the
mayor unfettered discretion to deny a [newsrack] permit application and unbounded authority to
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unconstitutional."); Chandler v. Town of Pittsfield, 496 A.2d 1058, 1061-63 (Me. 1985) ("The
present ordinance could easily become such an instrument of discrimination by a majority of the
councilmen giving ·what each might tJ,Jnk 'due consideration' to traffic problems a.11d thereafter
denying a permit in one instance while granting a permit in a less meritorious case, though acting
conscientiously in both. This would be possible because no uniform rules or regulations are
defined to remove the sphere of action from the influences of whim or caprice."); Application of
Ellis, 178 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.C. 1970); Appeal of Clements, 207 N.E.2d 573, 580-81 (Ohio Ct.

App. 1965); Drexel v. City of Miami Beach, 64 So.2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1953) ("We think a city
council may not deprive a person of his property by declining a permit to erect upon it a certain
type of garage where the only restriction on the use of the police power is that it shall not be
exercised before 'due consideration' is given by someone, presumably the councilmen, to the
effect of the building upon traffic. Both the quoted words, as well as their synonyms, could be
construed to allow all manner of latitude in the grant of a permit in one case and the denial of a
permit in a similar one, and would give every opportunity for the exercise of the power with
partiality. Such laxness and inexactness in a delegation of the power is not sanctioned by the
courts.").
Here, the City's ordinances (establishing a hillside classification) are not, in and of
themselves, insufficiently vague. In fact, as set forth hereinabove, the ordinances upon which the
City relies clearly do not apply to the Arnolds' property in the Mountain View Subdivision.
However, should the City be permitted to approve or deny building permit applications based
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case,
rule of law requiring that such decisions not be arbitrary or capricious will be cast aside, and all
of the constitutional dangers associated with vague ordinances (as described in the citations
,ihmrP) will' m~mifec:t. A mic:appl1Pli mrlina._l}rf". ic: per c:e UflJ:P>l<:Onl'lhlP anrl l".ar,nrit <:nppmt thP

denial of a building permit. See Lane Ranch Partnership, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780
("Here, the City viewed Lane Ranch's application as incomplete based on previous attempts by
Lane Ranch to subdivide the property. The City automatically assumed that the private road
application was another attempt to build a subdivision, rather than a legitimate attempt to gain
access to the property under the current applicable zoning standards. The City's interpretation of
their code is umeasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion under LC.§ 67-5279(3)(e)."). See

also, Vineyard Investments, LLC v. City of Madison, 999 So.2d 438, 440-42 (Miss. Ct. App.
2009) ("Thus, we are unable to find a legally valid reason for the City of Madison's denial of the
building permit application submitted by Vineyard. Additionally . . . we find that the City of
Madison did not have the discretion to deny said building permit as Vineyard had complied with
all building codes and zoning ordinances."); Norquest!RCA-W Bitter Lake Partnership v. City of

Seattle, 865 P.2d 18, 23-26 (Wash Ct. App. 1994) (evidence relied upon by city did not support
claimed violation of ordinance and building permit denial overturned).
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The City is not entitled to attorney fees on this Appeal, as the matters involved herein do
not warrant such an award in its favor. Although the City claims that there is "nothing for this
Court to review," the facts and law presented by the Arnolds suggest quite the opposite. Through

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 25
19372-003 I 886975

an
elimination

the Arnolds' right of access from Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds Street, which

restriction simply is not there. Indeed, the City has presented no evidence, and no authority, that
would authorize or justify a municipal government's ad hoc elimination of such an access right
without due process of law (including, at a minimum, a valid exercise of its police powers). In
turn, the District Court committed legal error of a constitutional nature when it determined that
the Arnolds could not construct a driveway onto their property from Ace of Diamonds Street,
erroneously concluding that it was "hard pressed to believe that just because a parcel abuts a city
street that parcel would be entitled to access to the street." (R., Vol. 1, p. 133.) As demonstrated
in the briefing now before this Court, the District Court's conclusion is exactly wrong on the law
of access rights in the absence of properly-exercised police power regulation. See, e.g., Johnson

v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 P.2d 291 (1964).
The rule of law that the City and the District Court have presented is not supported by
any precedent, and is one that would unconstitutionally open the door for the government to
usurp private property rights without any regard for due process or just compensation - or even a
valid exercise of police powers - based solely on the absence of express reservations or
conditions in plats. In other words, if a municipality wishes to remove private property rights, it
would only need to look back at historical plats (which may have been completed decades ago)
and point out that the original plats did not expressly reserve those rights, as opposed to
proceeding on the universally-recognized principle that unless such rights have been expressly
removed or abandoned, they continue to exist. There is no "reasonable basis in fact or law" for
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principles relating to private property rights. I.C. § 12-117(1 ). Additionally, by virtue of the fact
that the Arnolds had fully complied with all requirements set forth in the Stanley Municipal
Code for t.he issuance of Building Permit 831, the City had a "ministerial duty" to issue that
permit, and its refusal to do so based on pure speculation about the grade of the landscape was
necessarily arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. See Lomond, 92 Idaho at 600.
The City's reference to the earlier proceeding in which it was awarded attorney fees from
the Arnolds does nothing to support an award of fees to it in the case at bar. Needless to say, the
Arnolds disagree with the Court's award in the prior action, and believe that it merits reexamination. Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 345 P.3d 1008 (2015), indicates that
Idaho Code § 12-117 is intended to be a deterrent against groundless action against governmental
entities, and that attorney fees may be appropriate if the appellant raises the same arguments as
raised below. However, Arnold v. City of Stanley must not be read to suggest that every time a
party loses in the District Court, attorney fees are awardable if it pursues an appeal. That is,
however, the City's argument. In Arnold, the Arnolds were criticized by the Court for having lost
at the District Court, "yet they still chose to expend more time and resources to bring an appeal,
using the same arguments that were unpersuasive below .... " 158 Idaho at 226. Respectfully, by
operation of a long history of precedent by this Court, the Arnolds (and every other appellant)
are necessarily limited to "the same arguments that were unpersuasive below." See, e.g., Morgan
v. New Swed. Irrigation Dist., 156 Idaho 247, 253, 322 P.3d 980, 986 (2014) ("We do not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal."). While it is true that the Arnolds have herein
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citation to cases from around the country and from a variety of legal authorities, all of which
supports their argument. A litigant - especially one appealing an unconstitutional deprivation of
a private property right - should not be punished for exercising its appeal rights in the face of
adverse decisions at the District Court that are not reasonably based in fact or any known law or
precedent.
In contrast, the City has defended its actions frivolously since the inception of this
litigation. From the very beginning, the issue of whether the Arnolds had a legal right of access
to Ace of Diamonds street was not even properly before the City in ruling upon Building Permit
No. 831, but both it and the District Court improperly ruled as a matter of law that the Arnolds
do not have such a right. The City thus denied the Arnolds' request for a building permit on
unsound grounds, claiming (in contravention of all previous building permits that it had issued to
the Arnolds for this property, and in contravention of its own decision to not classify the
Mountain View Subdivision as a Hillside subdivision) that the Arnolds failed to provide
necessary information with their building permit application due to the City's new-found
decision that the Mountain View Subdivision should have been classified as a Hillside
subdivision and that the Arnolds' access rights to Ace of Diamonds Street were somehow
impliedly impaired by the approval of the Mountain View Subdivision. Through the City's
attempt to disparage the Arnolds by calling them "litigious," the City demonstrates that all of the
legally and factually flawed arguments presented in support of its denial are mere pretexts for the
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Building Permit 831 are as much without factual support as they are without legal merit. Should
any party be entitled to attorney fees in this Appeal, it is the property owners who have been
deprived of their constitutional property rights by the City and the District Court.
CONCLUSION
Because the City failed to strictly adhere to its own ordinances by instead denying the
Arnolds their Building Permit No. 831 on a record of pure conjecture, it acted arbitrarily and
capriciously as a matter of law. Further, by virtue of the fact that the City and the District Court
both concluded that the Arnolds were not entitled to construct their access driveway off of Ace
of Diamonds Street, due to the erroneous conclusion that the Mountain View Subdivision plat
had divested the Arnolds of their vested and appurtenant right of access, the decision of the City
was in violation of constitutional provisions governing access from private property to the public
roadways in Idaho. On the record before the Court, the Arnolds are entitled to a reversal of the
City's and the District Court's decisions, including and especially the decisions to eliminate the
Arnolds' vested and appurtenant access rights to the public streets abutting their property.

II
II
6

Though the City has attempted to disparage the Arnolds by calling them "litigious,"

basing its claim for attorney fees in this appeal largely on the fact that the City was awarded
attorney fees from the Arnolds in a previous appeal, there is no merit to the City's argument.
Here, the City and the District Court based their decisions upori a determination that the Arnolds
were somehow precluded from having more than one access point to their property - a legal
conclusion that has no basis in any precedent in this jurisdiction - but neither could point to any
fact or proceeding in which that access right was either expressly abandoned or lawfully taken.
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